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The reforms of China’s ﬁnancial system have signiﬁcantly changed the coun-
try’s ﬁnancial sector. One noteworthy phenomenon is that many nonﬁnancial
ﬁrms have obtained equity stakes in ﬁnancial institutions. This study investi-
gates the motivations behind and economic consequences of this recent prolif-
eration of investments in ﬁnancial institutions by nonﬁnancial listed ﬁrms. We
ﬁnd that the motivations for holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial institutions
include alleviating the pressure of industry competition, reducing transaction
costs, and diversiﬁcation to reduce risk. These investments, however, have
double-edged eﬀects on the performance of the investing ﬁrms. While their
investment income increases, their operating income and overall return on
assets decrease, as the investment income cannot compensate for the decrease
in other operating income. The investing ﬁrms’ cost of debt also increases, their
cash-holding decreases, and stock price performance does not improve after
investing in ﬁnancial institutions. These eﬀects contrast with the enthusiasm
nonﬁnancial listed ﬁrms have for investing in ﬁnancial institutions. The
empirical ﬁndings in this study can inform ﬁnancial industry regulators and
decision-makers in listed ﬁrms. We advise nonﬁnancial ﬁrms to be cautious
when considering investing in ﬁnancial institutions.
 2016 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of
Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City Univer-
sity of Hong Kong. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Yat-sen
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The debate over mixing/separating banking and commerce has carried on for centuries. The activities of
banks have been restricted since they ﬁrst emerged in the Mediterranean city states, and government limita-
tions on the trade investment of banks ﬁrst appeared in Venice in 1374 (Salley, 1976), before spreading
throughout continental Europe. The powers of England’s banks were restricted in the late 17th century,
and the practice was then exported to colonial America. The market collapse of 1929 in the U.S. and the sub-
sequent great depression reinforced restrictive powers of banks with the enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act in
1933 (Halpert, 1988). Today, ﬁnancial systems worldwide are generally regulated (Barth et al., 2001). The fear
of bank failure and monopoly were previously the main reasons to restrict bank powers, but today the most
common concerns include conﬂicts of interest, excessive bank powers, and threats to the safety net (Krainer,
2000). There are, however, obvious beneﬁts from the mixing of banking and commerce (Wall et al., 2008),
such as economies of scale and scope, the fostering of internal capital markets, and diversiﬁcation. The bound-
ary between banking and commerce has never been clear-cut. Merchant banking was very common among
banks in the Italian States of the Middle Ages (Craig, 2001), and universal banks in Germany and Japan have
long been encouraged. In the U.S. today, there are various ways banking and commerce mix (Haubrich and
Santos, 2003); commercial ﬁrms can own banks, for example. In fact, commercial ﬁrms throughout the world
are commonly found to possess equity stakes in banks.
Traditionally, the activities of banks are restricted from two dimensions; ﬁrst, from carrying out fee-based
activities such as securities, insurance, and real estate, and second, from owning commercial ﬁrms, and/or
from restricting commercial ﬁrms from owning banks. Globally, the divisions between bank and non-bank
ﬁnance have been dismantled since the late 20th century, and increasingly more countries allow commercial
ﬁrms to own banks. Bank ownership of commercial ﬁrms is permitted in Germany and other countries,
but with certain limitations. The eﬀect of bank ownership of ﬁrms, though restricted throughout the world,
has been examined in the literature. But commercial ﬁrms’ ownership in banks, though permitted in many
countries, has been largely ignored. In this study, we attempt to ﬁll this gap by investigating the motivations
and economic consequences of commercial ﬁrms’ equity stakes in banks. We also expand the concept of com-
bining banking and commerce to include the equity stakes in various types of ﬁnancial ﬁrms held by commer-
cial businesses. We deﬁne this as the integration of ﬁnance and commerce, where ﬁnance represents the broad
ﬁnancial sector including banks, securities, insurance, various funds, trusts, etc., and commerce represents the
nonﬁnancial sector as a whole.1
During China’s ﬁnancial system reforms, many commercial ﬁrms obtained equity stakes in ﬁnancial insti-
tutions.2 According to the Chinese Entrepreneurs Survey System (2011), 20.4% of ﬁrms surveyed had equity
investments in ﬁnancial institutions, and 27.8% had their own ﬁnance ﬁrms. The 2009 report of the
International Finance Research Institute of the Bank of China (2010) revealed that nonﬁnancial business
groups actually controlled 24 out of 52 trust ﬁrms, 19 out of the top 50 investment banks, 12 out of 25 prop-
erty insurance ﬁrms, and 20 out of 39 life insurance ﬁrms. These represent 46%, 38%, 48%, and 51%, respec-
tively. Even ﬁnancial institutions controlled by the government or ﬁnancial groups were found to be partially
held by nonﬁnancial ﬁrms. An increasing number of commercial ﬁrms are interested in investing in the ﬁnan-
cial sector. For example, in 2010 China Mobile obtained 20% of the equity in Shanghai Pudong Development
Bank for RMB39.8 billion. In 2013, Vanke invested RMB2.7 billion in Huishang Bank in exchange for 8.28%
ownership, and the Evergrande Group obtained 5% of Huaxia Bank in 2014. Alibaba and Tencent, the two
Chinese Internet giants, are currently expanding their ﬁnancial empire though Alipay and WeChat Wallet.1 Political economists view the integration of ﬁnance and commerce as creating ﬁnance capital. The concept of ﬁnance capital was ﬁrst
proposed by Hilferding (1910), and then taken up by Lenin in his wartime analysis of the imperialist relations of the great world powers.
Hilferding (1910) summarized the development of capitalism and concluded that ‘‘the most characteristic features of ‘modern’ capitalism
are those processes of concentration which, on the one hand, ‘eliminate free competition’ through the formation of cartels and trusts, and
on the other, bring bank and industrial capital into an ever more intimate relationship. Through this relationship capital assumes the form
of ﬁnance capital, its supreme and most abstract expression.”
2 In this study, commercial ﬁrms refer to all nonﬁnancial ﬁrms. Financial institutions include banks, and ﬁrms dealing in securities,
venture capital and private equity, insurance, ﬁnance, loans, trusts, guarantees, futures, asset management, investment funds, leasing, and
pawnshops, etc.
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action costs, and strategically diversify their operations. A large-scale capital ﬂow from commercial to ﬁnan-
cial sectors can, however, give rise to economic instability and resource allocation problems.3 There are also
concerns of contagion eﬀects. In this study, we attempt to discover the reasons behind these capital ﬂows and
explore their eﬀects on the performance of commercial ﬁrms. Using hand-collected data on the equity stakes in
ﬁnancial institutions held by Chinese nonﬁnancial listed ﬁrms between 1999 and 2012, we ﬁnd that the more
intensive the industry competition, the more likely that a commercial ﬁrm will invest in ﬁnancial institutions.
This eﬀect is more obvious in non-state controlled listed ﬁrms, when investee ﬁrms are non-bank ﬁnancial
institutions, and when investee ﬁrms are subject to less regulation. Reducing transaction costs is one motiva-
tion for commercial ﬁrms to hold equity stakes in banks. Consistent with the strategy of diversiﬁcation, larger
ﬁrms with higher proﬁtability, more debt, and with suﬃcient cash are more likely to invest in ﬁnancial
institutions. Finally, the ownership type and structure can aﬀect a commercial ﬁrms’ decision on investing
in ﬁnancial institutions.
The economic consequences of investing in ﬁnancial institutions by nonﬁnancial listed ﬁrms are not partic-
ularly good. We ﬁnd that as nonﬁnancial listed ﬁrms invest more in ﬁnancial institutions, their investment
income increases, but other operating income decreases and the overall return on assets decreases. Increases
in investment income cannot compensate for decreases in other operating income. Investing in ﬁnancial
institutions also increases the investing ﬁrms’ costs of debt, decreases their cash-holdings, and their stock price
performance does not improve. Investing in ﬁnancial institutions does not therefore improve ﬁrm perfor-
mance; in fact it deteriorates. Investing in ﬁnancial institutions is like a thorny rose; it looks beautiful, but
it can be dangerous.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the evolution of the global trend
of integrating of banking and commerce, particularly in China. Section 3 reviews the literature and presents
the theoretical analysis. Section 4 describes the research design, Section 5 reports the empirical results, and
Section 6 concludes the paper.2. Institutional background
2.1. The evolution of mixing banking and commerce worldwide
Modern banking developed in the Mediterranean city states in the 13th and 14th centuries from the
activities of ‘‘money changers” and merchants.4 To prevent banks from undertaking risky activities and
monopolizing particular commodities, their activities were at times restricted. For example, in 1374 the Vene-
tian Senate prohibited bankers from dealing in copper, tin, iron, lead, saﬀron, and honey. Regulation alone
was, however, not enough to prevent the economic and ﬁnancial disruptions associated with banking failures,
currency problems, and bubbles, so public banks were set up by governments. Established in 1694, the Bank of
England was a chartered bank. The activities of the public banks of the European continent and the chartered
banks in the U.K. were restricted and various regulations were imposed on them, to address monopoly and
public interest concerns. Early banks in the United States were modeled on the Bank of England, and were
prevented from engaging in mercantile enterprises. However, by the late 19th century, the bond departments
of large national banks in New York and Chicago had begun to undertake investment banking activities, and
eventually through securities aﬃliates they became involved in many types of ﬁnancial activities.
In October 1929, the New York Stock Exchange crashed, triggering the 1929–1933 global economic crisis.
The securities activities of commercial banks were blamed for fueling the crisis. In 1933, the Glass-Steagall Act
revoked the powers of commercial banks, preventing them from engaging in securities activities. However,
commercial banks could still expand into new activities through bank holding companies until 1956, when3 Wenzhou is a microcosm of economy instability arising from capital ﬂow from commercial to ﬁnancial sectors. As the birthplace of
private economy in China, Wenzhou has millions of small- and medium-sized ﬁrms. Over the years, these ﬁrms have lost their competitive
advantages. They invest their hot money in real estate, mining, the tertiary industry, and informal loans, resulting in a diminished
manufacturing sector. This triggered the large-scale bankruptcies of 2011 in Wenzhou.
4 The early upheavals of mixing/separation banking and commerce reviewed here are partly taken from Shull (1999).
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by exploiting various loopholes. In the 1980s, legal and market changes substantially aﬀected banks’ expan-
sion activities. Sears, a large conglomerate, was able own a retail enterprise, an insurance company, a securi-
ties ﬁrm, a real-estate development company, and a savings and loans company. Securities ﬁrms and insurance
companies could also acquire banks that refrained either from commercial lending or taking demand deposits.
The Glass-Steagall Act restrictions eased in the 1980s, and most of the barriers separating commercial banks
from nonbank ﬁnancial services were lifted by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.
Elsewhere in the world, relationships between banks and commerce are often much closer. Interestingly,
there are few explicit legal restrictions on the types of business a bank can undertake in the United Kingdom.
For many years they have been able to hold equities of commercial ﬁrms and commercial ﬁrms can hold bank
equities, but only since the ‘‘Big Bang” of 1987, commercial banks have aggressively moved into securities
trading and insurance. In the late 19th century, universal banks emerged on the European continent as part
of government eﬀorts to rapidly industrialize. Universal banks provide short-term bank credit and intermedi-
ate and long-term capital, through underwriting and investing in equities. Under the universal banking system,
banks and commercial companies maintain close and long-term relationships through ownership, credits,
boards of directors, etc. In Japan, after World War II, the Glass-Steagall restrictions were imposed under
the Securities Transaction Act of 1948, but banks and companies became associated in keiretsus (groups of
enterprises) and since the 1970s banking activities have expanded. The Financial System Reform Law of
1992 permitted Japanese banks to conduct securities business through subsidiaries in which they had a 50%
or greater share.
Industrial–ﬁnancial groups persist and often prosper in many developing countries. During the Soviet
regime, for example, the Russian banking system consisted of a single, monolithic bank owned by the state.
The ﬁnancial reforms of 1987 created three regional banks from the former state bank. The reforms of the
early 1990s enabled a large number of private banks, over 2000 by 1993, to be established in Russia. The free-
dom to set up and own banks led to widespread enterprise shareholding. According to a survey in 1994
(Belyanova and Rozinsky, 1995), ownership of new banks was dominated by new private companies, while
former state banks were in the main held by state institutions, state enterprises, private enterprises, and indi-
viduals, each with around 25% of the shares. Bank ownership of enterprises is, however, much less widespread.
The banking industry of Taiwan was deregulated in the early 1990s, and before this liberalization most banks
were state-owned and banking entry was highly regulated. The Ministry of Finance revised the Banking Law
in 1991 to allow for the setting up of private commercial banks. Deregulation provided a means for the entry
of private banks into the market, and the number of banks increased from 24 in 1990 to 51 in 2003 (Ma, 2007).
To summarize, worldwide deregulation has greatly broadened the activities of banks, but there are still
substantial variation in the ability of banks to engage in securities, insurance, and real estate activities and
in the combining of banking and commerce in diﬀerent countries (Barth et al., 2001). More research into these
variations is therefore required.2.2. The integration of ﬁnance and commerce in China
2.2.1. Investing in commercial banks
The ﬁnancial system of China was highly centralized under the Ministry of Finance after the establishment
of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The People’s Bank of China was the mono-bank and engaged in
savings, credit, and money supply. Market entry and ﬁnancial innovation was suppressed. Decentralization
gradually followed with China’s reform and open policy, and in 1979 the People’s Bank of China separated
from the Ministry of Finance and became the central bank. Subsequently, the Bank of China, the China Con-
struction Bank, the Agricultural Bank of China, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China were
established and began functioning as commercial banks. The joint stock commercial banks emerged in the
1980s. Of these, the Bank of Communications was the ﬁrst national joint stock commercial bank, with
72% of its stocks held by the state and local government, and 28% by commercial ﬁrms. It was the ﬁrst time
commercial ﬁrms were allowed to enter the banking sector. Investment in the banking sector by commercial
ﬁrms has since grown rapidly, and they have become important stakeholders in many commercial banks, suchPlease cite this article in press as: Xu, L., Xin, Y. Thorny roses: The motivations and economic consequences of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial
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Pudong Development Bank.
2.2.2. Establishing ﬁnance ﬁrms
To facilitate the development of business groups, the State Council issued Provisions on Further Promoting
the Horizontal Economic Alliance in 1986, and Opinions on the Formation and Development of Business Groups
in 1987. These regulations allowed business groups to set up ﬁnance ﬁrms with the approval of the People’s
Bank of China. Finance ﬁrms can arrange borrowing and lending within the business group, and carry out
transactions with banks or other ﬁnancial institutions. Business groups can raise money from the public.
The ﬁrst ﬁnance company approved was the Dongfeng Motor Finance Company, established in May 1987,
and many business groups have since established ﬁnance subsidiaries, including Petrol China, China Power,
the CITIC Group, the China Everbright Group, China Wanxiang, the New Hope Group, the Haier Group,
etc. By the end of 2015, 186 ﬁnance ﬁrms were organized by commercial ﬁrms in China.5
2.2.3. Cross-industry operations and the formation of ﬁnancial holding groups
The four state-owned banks began multi-operations in 1984, in areas such as securities, leasing, real estate,
and investment. The People’s Bank of China was at the time both central bank and regulatory body, in charge
of the regulation of banking, investment banking, insurance, and trust ﬁrms. However, due to the weak legal
system, insuﬃcient discipline, and a lack of risk control, the money from the banking sector ﬂooded into the
stock market and real estate. This dried up the credit funds available for enterprises, producing bubbles in
the stock and real estate markets. By the beginning of the 1990s the ﬁnancial system was seriously chaotic,
the inﬂation rate was high, and the economy overheated. The central government then began to rectify and
regulate the ﬁnancial market, and in 1993 the State Council issued the Decision on the Reform of the Financial
System, proposing the separation principle for the ﬁnancial industry. The Law of the People’s Bank of China,
the Law of Commercial Banks, and the Law of Insurance were successively issued since 1995. These laws set
up the rules of separating banking from commerce, and separating banking, investment banking, and insur-
ance. Banks are prevented from owning equities in commercial ﬁrms, but commercial ﬁrms can still invest in
banks. The China Securities Regulatory Commission was established in 1992 followed by the setting up of the
China Banking Regulatory Commission and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission. These regulatory
bodies aided the development of a sound ﬁnancial market.
A global trend of broadening bank activities has emerged since the 1990s, and China’s separate operation
model was also relaxed. Commercial banks were able to set up fund management subsidiaries. And cross-
industry operations could be realized through holding companies. For example, the Ping An China Group
has insurance, securities, and commercial banking subsidiaries. The separation of Chinese banking and com-
merce is also a unilateral separation: commercial ﬁrms can invest in the ﬁnancial sector.
An increasing number of business groups have entered the ﬁnancial industry since 1997. The Haier Group
invested RMB500 million in Qingdao Bank in 2001, and invested in Changjiang Securities and the Anshan
Trust and Investment Co. It established its own ﬁnance subsidiary in 2002. The Luneng Group has strategi-
cally become the largest shareholder of Huaxia Bank, Xiangcai Securities, and Weishen Securities, the fourth
largest shareholder of the Bank of Communications, and the controlling shareholder of Jinan Yingda Inter-
national Trust and Shandong Jinshui Futures. Another example is the New Hope Group, the founding inves-
tor of China Minsheng Bank, which has now expanded its investment into insurance, securities, and
investment ﬁrms. The main investing force in the ﬁnancial industry is in fact the ﬁrms controlled by SASAC
(State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council). Most SASAC-
controlled ﬁrms have established ﬁnance subsidiaries, with some extending to banking, securities, insurance,
and futures. In addition, many local governments restructured their banking, securities, insurance, trust, and
leasing aﬃliates into controlling ﬁnancial groups after 2009.5 The statistics are obtained from the website of the China Banking Regulatory Commission: http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/jrjg/index.
html
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ment, Transition, and Upgrading. The Guidance proposed 10 reform policies encouraging private capital to
invest in ﬁnancial institutions. By the end of 2013, 36 commercial banks were approved to be sponsored by
private capital.
2.2.4. The rise of supply chain ﬁnance and Internet ﬁnance
In recent years, certain group companies have started to explore a new ﬁnancing business model, providing
ﬁnancial services along the group supply chain. This innovation is known as supply chain ﬁnance, and it pro-
vides short-term credit and optimizes working capital for both the buyer and seller. Internet ﬁnance is another
emerging innovation. E-commerce ﬁrms are able to start up various ﬁnancial services by leveraging their cus-
tomer and big data advantages. The businesses involve credit cards, mini-loans, insurance, and asset manage-
ment. These new ﬁnancing models have come into being through commercial ﬁrms rather than traditional
ﬁnancial institutions.
To summarize, China’s ﬁnancial market is emerging from its preliminary stage. In the process, we witness
the unprecedented enthusiasm of commercial ﬁrms to invest in various sectors of the ﬁnancial industry. This
wave of enthusiasm for the ﬁnancial sector promises technology and business innovations, but there are also
possible hidden risks.
3. Literature review and theoretical underpinning
Theoretically, there are both costs and beneﬁts of merging banking and commerce. The often-claimed ben-
eﬁts are a reduction of portfolio risk, economics of scale and/or scope, new sources of capital, a reduction of
transaction costs, etc. The cost concerns include conﬂicts of interest, excessive market power, and risk conta-
gion. The economic perspectives of bank ownership in commercial ﬁrms have been investigated, particularly in
relation to German and Japanese banks. The ﬁndings of empirical studies generally support the theoretical
arguments that banks’ equity stakes in commercial ﬁrms reduce agency costs and the cost of capital, aﬀect
ﬁrm performance, and lower the cost of ﬁnancial distress (see the review of Santos, 1997). The motivations
and economic consequences of commercial ﬁrms’ equity stakes in banks are, however, relatively unexamined.
Ma (2007) argues that the investment by Taiwan ﬁrms during 1990s in the banking sector was used as a
strategic commitment to an aggressive output stance, thus moving the industry to an equilibrium that is more
favorable to the ﬁrms. Laeven (2001) and others ﬁnd that the extensive enterprise ownership of banks in
Russia fostered related lending. Lu et al. (2012) investigate the economic consequences of holding 5% or greater
equity stakes in banks by nonﬁnancial listed ﬁrms from 2006 to 2008 in China. They ﬁnd that for non-state-
owned ﬁrms, holding signiﬁcant bank ownership leads to lower interest expenses and less ﬁnancial constraints.
Combining these theoretical predictions and empirical ﬁndings with practices in China, we propose that obtain-
ing high returns in the ﬁnancial industry, reducing transaction costs, and diversifying risk are the three main
economic reasons Chinese nonﬁnancial ﬁrms expand their operations into the ﬁnancial sector.
3.1. Obtaining high returns of ﬁnancial industry
Capital is proﬁt driven. Tobin (1969) explains how money and capital can be inter-convertible using q the-
ory. When q is greater than 1, the valuation of existing capital is higher than its replacement cost, causing
investment in real capital. However, when q is smaller than 1, the valuation of existing capital is lower than
its replacement cost. Selling assets at replacement cost and investment in the money market can reap higher
returns on capital. In a similar vein, Porter (1985) points out that when an industry’s rate of return stays at a
low level and there is no sign of improvement in the future, ﬁrms in that industry will look elsewhere for better
investment opportunities. The ﬁnancial industry has traditionally featured high returns and high risk. Over the
past ten years, the banking sector has been the most proﬁtable industry in China, and higher proﬁts have
attracted more investment.6 Therefore, we argue that the primary motivation for listed ﬁrms to invest in6 For example, in 2011, the average rate of return for the commercial sector was about 8%. For the same year, the return on equity for
commercial banks was 20.4% (Yang and Dai, 2012).
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with life-cycle theory, which states that mature ﬁrms with abundant cash ﬂow will start new businesses to sus-
tain growth.
3.2. Reducing transaction costs
Firms and markets are two substitutable forms of resource allocation. The scope of a ﬁrm is determined by
balancing the costs of organizing within the ﬁrm with the costs of organizing in another ﬁrm, or the costs
involved in leaving the transaction to be organized by the price mechanism (Coase, 1937). Williamson
(1979, 1985) pointed out that transaction costs include those of search and information, bargaining, and polic-
ing and enforcement. Firms weigh the costs of exchanging resources in the environment against the bureau-
cratic costs of performing activities in-house. Transaction costs related to the exchange of resources with the
external environment may be reﬂected by environmental uncertainty, opportunism, risks, bounded rationality,
core company assets, etc. For example, if ﬁrms view the environmental uncertainty as high, they may choose
not to outsource or exchange resources with the environment.
Goto (1982) and Diamond (1984) use transaction cost theory to identify the fundamental reason for the exis-
tence of business groups and conglomerates. Goto (1982) states that if a ﬁrm forms or joins a group, it can econ-
omize on the transaction costs it would have incurred if the transaction had been carried out through themarket,
and can at the same time avoid the scale diseconomies or control losses that would have occurred if it had
expanded internally and performed the transaction within the ﬁrm. If the net beneﬁt of forming or joining a
group exceeds that of implementing a transaction with the ﬁrm or through the market, the ﬁrm has the incentive
to form or to join a group. This explains the existence of universal banks in Germany and of Keiretsus in Japan.
Diamond (1984) develops a theory of ﬁnancial intermediation based onminimizing the cost of monitoring infor-
mation, which is useful in resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders. A ﬁnancing intermediary
has a net cost advantage relative to direct lending and borrowing, but intermediaries must bear certain risks for
incentive purposes. To diversify the risks, ﬁnancial intermediaries and ﬁrms can form conglomerates.
Hoshi et al. (1991) provide empirical evidence that within business groups where banks own large equity
stakes in member ﬁrms and lend considerable capital, the information and incentive costs are low, free-
rider problems can be reduced, and the costs of ﬁnancial distress are also lower. In China, bank loans are
the main source of ﬁnancing (Allen et al., 2007). Due to transaction costs, credit quotas, and lending discrim-
inants, many ﬁrms, particularly private ones, are constrained when obtaining bank loans. To ﬁnance their
projects, ﬁrms need to maintain sound relationships with banks. They may even directly own equity stakes
in banks.7 Therefore, we predict that by investing in ﬁnancial institutions, ﬁrms can internalize transaction
costs when obtaining ﬁnance.
3.3. Diversiﬁcation strategy
Commercial ﬁrms invest in the ﬁnancial sector to diversify. There are costs and beneﬁts to diversiﬁcation.
Diversiﬁed ﬁrms can utilize the internal capital markets to better allocate ﬁrm resources (Stein, 1997). Diver-
siﬁcation also brings synergy eﬀects and reduces risk (Hill and Hoskisson, 1987; Amit and Livnat, 1988).
Diversiﬁcation can, however, aggregate agency problems (Jensen, 1986). Managers use diversiﬁcation to avoid
risks and increase ﬁrm size uneconomically (Rajan et al., 2000). By investing in the ﬁnancial sector, commer-
cial ﬁrms can utilize investment opportunities that diﬀer from their own line of business while stabilizing their
overall income. For example, the Baosteel Group realized its income even in years when the steel industry as a
whole was suﬀering losses, by reaping its proﬁts from the ﬁnancial sector.7 The Law of Commercial Banks released in 2003, article 40, states that commercial banks shall not issue credit loans to related parties;
the provisions of collateral debt a commercial bank issued to related parties shall not be superior to those of similar debt issued to other
parties. Where related parties include (1) the directors, supervisors, managers, and creditors and their close relatives of a commercial bank;
and (2) the corporations, enterprises, and other economic organizations those listed above persons in or serve as top management.
However, these regulations do not bar the issuance of credit debt to shareholders by commercial ﬁrms, as long as the shareholder has not
appointed directors, supervisors, or managers to its invested banks. Even if the shareholder of a commercial bank has appointed directors,
and/or supervisors, and/or managers to the invested bank, the bank can still issue collateral debt to its shareholder.
Please cite this article in press as: Xu, L., Xin, Y. Thorny roses: The motivations and economic consequences of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial
institutions for China’s listed nonﬁnancial ﬁrms. China Journal of Accounting Research (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2016.04.001
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4.1. Models
Based on previous analysis, we construct regression models to investigate the motivations and economic
consequences of commercial companies holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial ﬁrms. We identify three motivations
for commercial ﬁrms to invest in the ﬁnancial sector: obtaining high returns, reducing transaction costs, and
diversifying to reduce risks. We expect that when an industry’s competition intensiﬁes, returns decrease, and a
ﬁrm will seek to invest in a more prosperous and proﬁtable industry. We use the Herﬁndahl index (HHI, where
a lower HHI indicates a higher level of competition) to measure the extent of industry competition, Q to mea-
sure investment opportunities, and ROA to measure proﬁtability. We predict that the lower the HHI, the
lower the Q, and the lower the ROA, the more likely a ﬁrm is to invest in the ﬁnancial sector. A ﬁrm needs
external ﬁnance to support its growth. In a perfect world, a ﬁrm can obtain ﬁnance without cost, so ﬁnancing
will be determined by the investment opportunity. However, in the real world, transaction costs make ﬁnanc-
ing expensive. Firms are often ﬁnancially constrained. We use the cost of debt ﬁnancing to measure the trans-
action costs for obtaining loans. We expect that the higher the debt cost, the more likely ﬁrms will be to invest
in the ﬁnancial sector. Based on diversiﬁcation theory, larger ﬁrms, older ﬁrms, and those with more cash ﬂow
are more likely to diversify operations and invest in the ﬁnancial sector.
Investment in ﬁnancial institutions constitutes one part of investment decisions. Therefore we control for
other factors that inﬂuence investment, including internal cash ﬂow (Cashﬂow), the level of debt (LEV), and
uncertainty (Risk). In China, government control and institutional environments are important determinants
of economic decisions, so we control for government control (GOV, a dummy variable for state-controlled
ﬁrms), ownership concentration (Top1, the ownership of the largest shareholder), and the extent of marketiza-
tion (Lnmindex).
We use a Logit model to investigate the motivations of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial institutions. The
model is as follows:Please
instituLogitðpÞ ¼ Pðy i;t ¼ 1Þ
¼ b0 þ b1HHIi;t þ b2Qi;t1 þ b3ROAi;t þ b4Debtcosti;t þ b5Sizei;t1 þ b6Lnagei;t
þ b7Cashholdingi;t1 þ b8Cashflowi;t þ b9LEVi;t1 þ b10Riski;t þ b11GOVi;t þ b12Top1i;t
þ b13Lnmindexi;t þYearDummiesþ eit ð1ÞP represents the probability of a nonﬁnancial listed ﬁrm investing in the ﬁnancial sector. The dependent
variables are Dﬁnﬁrm, Dﬁnﬁrmb, or Dﬁnﬁrmr. Table 1 gives the deﬁnitions of the variables.
To investigate the economic consequences of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial ﬁrms, we test the changes in
ﬁrm performance before and after investing in the ﬁnancial industry. In particular, we check the ROA and the
components of ROA: CROA (operating return on total assets) and IROA (investment income on total assets).
We also test for changes in the cost of debt (Debtcost), cash-holdings of investing ﬁrms (Cashholding), and
stock price performance (Rw).
We use the following ﬁxed-eﬀect panel data regression to evaluate the inﬂuence of investing in the ﬁnancial
industry on ﬁrm performance:Performancei;t ¼ b0 þ b1FINi;t þ b2Sizei;t1 þ b3LEVi;t1 þ b4Qi;t1 þ b5Riski;t þ b6Lnagei;t
þ b7GOVi;t þ b8Top1i;t þ b9Lnmindexi;t þYeardummyþ eit ð2ÞIn model (2), the dependent variable, Performance, takes CROA, IROA, ROA, Debtcost, Rw, and Cash-
holding, where applicable. The main independent variable is the indicator of investing in the ﬁnancial sector,
and takes Dﬁn, Dﬁn and Dﬁnb, Dﬁn and Dﬁnr, Dﬁn and Ratio1, and Dﬁn and Ratio2, respectively. Size,
LEV, Q, Risk, Lnage, GOV, Top1, and Lnindex are control variables. The model also controls for ﬁrm-
and year-ﬁxed eﬀects. The variable deﬁnitions are given in Table 1.cite this article in press as: Xu, L., Xin, Y. Thorny roses: The motivations and economic consequences of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial
tions for China’s listed nonﬁnancial ﬁrms. China Journal of Accounting Research (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2016.04.001
Table 1
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variable Deﬁnition
Dﬁnﬁrm Dummy variable, coded 1 for ﬁrms with equity investment in the ﬁnancial sector during 1999–2012, and 0 for ﬁrms
without equity investment in the ﬁnancial sector. This variable is coded at the ﬁrm-level. That is, if in any year during
1999–2012 a ﬁrm has equity investment in the ﬁnancial sector, all the years of this ﬁrm are coded 1
Dﬁnﬁrmb Dummy variable, coded 1 for ﬁrms with equity investment in the banking sector during 1999–2012 and 0 otherwise, also
coded at the ﬁrm-level
Dﬁnﬁrmr Dummy variable, coded 1 for ﬁrms with equity investment in banking, securities, and insurance sectors, where
regulations are strict; coded 0 for ﬁrms with equity investment in the less-regulated ﬁnancial sector, also coded at the
ﬁrm-level
Dﬁn Dummy variable, coded 1 for ﬁrm-years with equity investment in the ﬁnancial sector, and 0 otherwise. This variable is
coded at the ﬁrm-year-level
Dﬁnb Dummy variable, coded 1 for ﬁrm-years with equity investment in the banking sector, and 0 otherwise. This variable is
coded at the ﬁrm-year-level
Dﬁnr Dummy variable, coded 1 for ﬁrm-years with equity investment in banking, securities and insurance sectors with strict
regulation; and 0 for ﬁrm-years with equity investment in the less-regulated ﬁnancial sector. This variable is coded at the
ﬁrm-year-level
Invamt The total balance of equity investment in ﬁnancial institutions in RMB Yuan as at the end of a year
Ratio1 The ﬁrst depth measure of equity investment in ﬁnancial institutions, calculated as the total balance of equity investment
in ﬁnancial institutions divided by total assets
Ratio2 The second depth measure of equity investment in ﬁnancial institutions, calculated as the total balance of equity
investment in ﬁnancial institutions divided by net assets
HHI The Herﬁndahl index based on the ratio of industry turnover. The lower the index, the more intensive the competition
Q The market-to-book ratio, calculated as the sum of market capitalization and the book value of debt divided by book
value of total assets
CROA Operating return on assets, calculated as operating earnings divided by average total assets
IROA Investment return on total assets, calculated as investment income divided by average total assets
ROA Return on assets, calculated as net income divided by average total assets
Debtcost Cost of debt, calculated as ﬁnancial expenses divided by average interest bearing debt
Size Firm size, calculated as the log of total assets
Lnage Log of listing age
Cashholding Cash divided by total assets
Cashﬂow Cash ﬂows from operating activities divided by total assets at the beginning of the year
LEV Leverage, calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets
Risk Stock price volatility, calculated as the standard deviation of weekly stock returns during a year
Rw Stock return, calculated as the mean of weekly market adjusted idiosyncratic stock returns during a year
GOV Dummy variable for the type of shareholder, coded 1 for ﬁrms whose ultimate controlling shareholder is government or
state asset management bureaus
Top1 The ownership ratio of the largest shareholder
Lnmindex Log of the marketization index, which is the index of marketization of Fan et al. (2011). For ﬁrm-years in 2010, the
index is estimated based on the change tendency during 2007–2009 (Mindex2010 = Mindex2009 + Min-
dex2008 Mindex2007); for ﬁrm-years after 2010, the estimated 2010 index is used
L. Xu, Y. Xin / China Journal of Accounting Research xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 94.2. Sample and data
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has required listed ﬁrms to publicly release detailed
annual reports since 1999, which is therefore when our sample starts. Before 2007, equity investment was
reported in the ‘‘long-term investment” account and since then, if the invested ﬁrm was listed, the investments
were transferred to ‘‘available-for-sale” investments. For equity investment with over 50% ownership, the sub-
sidiary is consolidated and not reported in the ‘‘long-term investment” account, but it can be traced in the
footnotes of ﬁnancial statements, where subsidiary information is disclosed. We therefore hand-collect invest-
ment totals, and the ratios invested in ﬁnancial ﬁrms by nonﬁnancial listed companies, from the annual
reports. The ﬁnancial ﬁrms identiﬁed include ﬁrms providing services of banking, loans, securities, venture
capital and private equity, insurance, ﬁnance, trusts, guarantees, futures, asset management, investment funds,
leasing, and pawnshops. The sample period is 1999–2012. The ﬁnancial and corporate governance data and
stock returns are extracted from Wind and CSMAR.Please cite this article in press as: Xu, L., Xin, Y. Thorny roses: The motivations and economic consequences of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial
institutions for China’s listed nonﬁnancial ﬁrms. China Journal of Accounting Research (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2016.04.001
Table 2
Research sample.
Invest in ﬁnancial sector
during 1999–2012?
Invest in ﬁnancial sector in a certain year? Yes No
No A
C
Yes B
Sample for
motivation test
A & C, Dﬁnﬁrm coded 1 for ﬁrm-years in district A, and 0 for
those in district C
Sample 1 for
consequence test
A, C & B, Dﬁn coded 1 for ﬁrm-years in district B, and 0 for
those in district A and C
Sample 2 for
consequence test
A & B, Dﬁn coded 1 for ﬁrm-years in district B, and 0 for those
in district A
10 L. Xu, Y. Xin /China Journal of Accounting Research xxx (2016) xxx–xxxWe start with all nonﬁnancial A-share listed ﬁrms from 1999 to 2012, and exclude extreme observations (for
example, if the debt-to-asset ratio is greater than 1) and ﬁrm-years with missing values. The resulting sample is
made up of 15,741 ﬁrm-year observations. Depending on the status of the equity stakes held in ﬁnancial insti-
tutions, the 15,471 observations are divided into ﬁve groups. The ﬁrst consists of 4778 observations for ﬁrms
that never invest in ﬁnancial institutions, and the second of 3719 for ﬁrms consistently reporting investments
in ﬁnancial institutions for all years of the sample period. The third group consists of 4070 observations for
ﬁrms with no equity investment in ﬁnancial institutions at the beginning of the sample period but that invest in
ﬁnancial institutions later. The fourth group comprises of 1247 observations for ﬁrms that initially have equity
stakes in ﬁnancial institutions but then sell them, and the last consists of 1927 observations for ﬁrms that occa-
sionally invest in ﬁnancial institutions.
To obtain a clean test sample we use the ﬁrst and third groups totaling 8848 observations to investigate the
motivations and the economic consequences of investing in ﬁnancial institutions.8,9We use the ﬁrst group and
the early year observations of the third group before ﬁrms have invested in the ﬁnancial sector to investigate
motivations. The dummy variable Dﬁnﬁrm is coded 1 for ﬁrms that invest in the ﬁnancial sector later in the
1999–2012 period and 0 otherwise. Dﬁnﬁrm is a ﬁrm-level indicator. We use two samples to investigate the
performance of investing in the ﬁnancial sector. The ﬁrst consists of all observations in the ﬁrst and third
group, and the dummy variable Dﬁn is coded 1 for ﬁrm-years with investments in equity stakes of ﬁnancial
institutions and 0 otherwise. This construction results in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence test of the economic conse-
quences when Chinese nonﬁnancial listed ﬁrms integrate ﬁnance and commerce. The second sample consists of
observations from the third group, where the dummy variable Dﬁn is coded 1 for ﬁrm-years with equity
investment in ﬁnancial institutions and 0 otherwise.10 Using the second sample, we can compare ﬁrm perfor-
mance before and after equity stakes in ﬁnancial institutions are held. Table 2 summarizes the construction
process of the test samples.5. Empirical results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
In empirical tests, all continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%, except the marketization index
(Lnmindex). Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the research sample. The ﬁrm-level statistics show
that on average, 46% of ﬁrms have equity investment in the ﬁnancial sector between 1999 and 2012, and
21.21% of ﬁrms hold equity stakes in banks, with 28.05% holding equity stakes in banking, securities, and8 Typically, the sample for the Logistic regression can be obtained by matching the research sample with a control sample. The matching
standards can be industry, ﬁrm size, proﬁtability, ... and so on, depending on the research scenario. However, in this study, industry, ﬁrm
size, proﬁtability, and other ﬁrm characteristics are independent variables of interest. If these diﬀerences are removed, the regression will
become meaningless.
9 As lag variables are used, the regression sample is slightly smaller.
10 This sample is used in robustness checks.
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics.
Obs. Mean Median S.D. Minimum Maximum
Dﬁnﬁrm 8848 0.4600 0 0.4984 0 1
Dﬁnﬁrmb 8848 0.2121 0 0.4088 0 1
Dﬁnﬁrmr 8848 0.2805 0 0.4493 0 1
Dﬁn 8848 0.2722 0 0.4451 0 1
Dﬁnb 8848 0.1118 0 0.3151 0 1
Dﬁnr 8848 0.1667 0 0.3727 0 1
Invamt 8848 5.1306 * 10
7 0 3.4742 * 10
8 0 1.65 * 1010
Ratio1 8848 0.0081 0 0.0277 0 0.2216
Ratio2 8848 0.0171 0 0.0572 0 0.4579
HHI 8848 0.0751 0.0465 0.0966 0.0193 0.8236
Q 8848 1.6093 1.3172 0.8757 0.6723 6.1038
CROA 8848 0.0440 0.0408 0.0661 0.1869 0.2435
IROA 8848 0.0064 0.0009 0.0179 0.0267 0.1084
ROA 8848 0.0385 0.0370 0.0597 0.2006 0.2111
Debtcost 8848 0.0525 0.0364 0.5140 4.4348 0.1594
Size 8848 21.4987 21.3298 1.1668 19.2094 26.0217
Age 8848 8.0118 7 4.6009 1 20
Lnage 8848 1.8752 1.9459 0.6992 0 2.9957
Cashholding 8848 0.1734 0.1414 0.1271 0.0059 0.6636
Cashﬂow 8848 0.0551 0.0526 0.0996 0.2717 0.3738
LEV 8848 0.4709 0.4775 0.1933 0.0508 0.9369
Risk 8848 0.0454 0.0428 0.0175 0.0163 0.0985
GOV 8848 0.6443 1 0.4787 0 1
Top1 8848 0.3928 0.3794 0.1613 0.0909 0.7500
Mindex 8848 7.9440 7.97 2.3758 1.72 12.04
Lnmindex 8848 2.0218 2.0757 0.3305 0.5423 2.4882
L. Xu, Y. Xin / China Journal of Accounting Research xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 11insurance institutions over the same period. At the ﬁrm-year-level, on average 27.22% have equity investment
in the ﬁnancial sector, 11.18% in the banking sector, and 16.67% in banking, securities, and the insurance sec-
tor. The depth of investment in the ﬁnancial sector on average is 0.81% of total assets and 1.71% of net assets,
with maximums of 22.16% of total assets and 45.79% of net assets. The investment amount averages
5.1306 * 107 and the maximum value is 1.65 * 10
10. Investing in ﬁnancial institutions is therefore very attrac-
tive for nonﬁnancial listed Chinese ﬁrms, though the level of investment varies greatly.11 We conduct corre-
lation checks for independent variables and ﬁnd that the Pearson correlation coeﬃcients are below 0.4, so
multicollinearity is not serious in our research.125.2. Motivations for investing in ﬁnancial institutions
Here we examine the results of logistic regressions of the determinants or motivations of investing in the
ﬁnancial sector. Government and regulation are important inﬂuencers of economic life in China, so we there-
fore investigate state-controlled ﬁrms and non-state controlled ﬁrms separately. The ﬁnancial sector is highly
regulated, and banking, securities, and insurance industries are subject to the strictest regulations. For nonﬁ-
nancial ﬁrms, the goal of investing in the strictly regulated ﬁnancial sector may be to obtain permits rather
than proﬁts. We therefore separately investigate the motivations of investing in the strictly regulated ﬁnancial
sector and in the relatively less strictly regulated sector. As the debate on separating banking and commerce11 Note that the statistics here are for Group 1 and 3 only. The remaining three groups of ﬁrms all occasionally had equity investment in
the ﬁnancial sector. Therefore, the popularity of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial institutions is much more common for non-ﬁnancial
listed ﬁrms as a whole.
12 To save space, the correlation coeﬃcients are not reported but are available upon request.
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Table 4a
Determinants of equity investment in ﬁnancial institutions.
Whole sample State-controlled ﬁrms Non-state-controlled ﬁrms
Coef. Z value Coef. Z value Coef. Z value
Constant 8.0257 8.85*** 7.5275 7.12*** 9.2915 4.71***
HHI 0.7330 2.26** 0.2391 0.66 2.7700 3.31***
Q 0.0075 0.12 0.0456 0.57 0.1151 1.16
ROA 3.7831 5.61*** 3.2537 3.92*** 4.2071 3.53***
Debtcost 0.0069 0.08 0.1383 1.38 0.6264 1.76*
Size 0.3942 9.33*** 0.3894 8.00*** 0.4201 4.60***
Lnage 0.4471 6.16*** 0.5115 5.72*** 0.4198 3.11***
Cashholding 1.6175 4.90*** 1.5043 3.66*** 2.1255 3.69***
Cashﬂow 0.3878 1.05 1.0027 2.17** 0.7706 1.22
LEV 1.3940 6.30*** 1.2176 4.57*** 1.9846 4.76***
Risk 5.1940 1.79* 9.2367 2.62*** 4.4854 0.85
GOV 0.0299 0.37 – – – –
Top1 0.4714 2.09** 0.9957 3.80*** 1.0241 2.25**
Lnmindex 0.0028 0.02 0.1948 1.24 0.5001 1.95*
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled
LR chi2 648.29*** 480.84*** 192.06***
Pseudo R2 0.1066 0.1127 0.1075
OBS 5103 3464 1639
Note: the Z values are calculated using robust standard errors.
*** Indicates the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 1%.
** Indicates the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 5%.
* Indicates the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 10%.
12 L. Xu, Y. Xin /China Journal of Accounting Research xxx (2016) xxx–xxxhas continued for many years, we also test the motivations of equity investments in banks and non-bank ﬁrms
separately. Tables 4a and 4b report the results.
Tables 4a and 4b shows that the coeﬃcient on the extent of industry competition (HHI) is negative in six
out of seven regressions, indicating that the lower the HHI (i.e., the higher the extent of industry competition),
the more likely nonﬁnancial ﬁrms are to invest in the ﬁnancial sector. The negative coeﬃcients are, however,
signiﬁcant only for the whole sample, the non-state controlled ﬁrm sample, the non-bank equity investment
sample, and for the sample of investment in relatively less strictly regulated industries. The extent of industry
competition is not a consideration for state-controlled ﬁrms, for those investing in the banking sector, and
those investing in the strictly regulated sector. Government inﬂuence, rather than market forces, may drive
the investment decisions of state-controlled ﬁrms. We also ﬁnd that obtaining permits, rather than industry
competition pressure, is the main concern when investing in the banking sector and the highly regulated ﬁnan-
cial sector.
The coeﬃcients on the cost of interest-bearing debt (Debtcost) are signiﬁcant only in the non-state con-
trolled sample and in the investment in the banking sector regression, which indicates that non-state controlled
ﬁrms are more ﬁnancially constrained and aim to reduce transaction costs by investing in the ﬁnancial sector.
Firms with higher debt costs are more likely to invest in banks, in the hope of reducing their debt costs.
The coeﬃcients on proﬁtability (ROA), leverage (LEV), ﬁrm size (Size), and cash holding (Cashholding)
are statistically positive across the seven regressions. More proﬁtable and larger ﬁrms, and those with ample
debt ﬁnancing and abundant cash, are therefore more likely to investment in the ﬁnancial sector, as they are
less ﬁnancially constrained. Their motivations for holding equity investment in ﬁnancial institutions are more
consistent with the diversiﬁcation strategy. The coeﬃcient on listing age (Lnage) is, however, negative and
signiﬁcant, which seems inconsistent with diversiﬁcation theory, but the unique IPO market in China, with
its high oﬀering prices, high pricing in terms of P/E ratio, and high over-raised funds, causes newly listed ﬁrms
to over-invest, including investing in the ﬁnancial sector.
The explanatory power of the major determinants of investment, investment opportunity (Q), internal cash
ﬂow (Cashﬂow), and uncertainty (Risk) varies. The coeﬃcients on investment opportunity are not signiﬁcantPlease cite this article in press as: Xu, L., Xin, Y. Thorny roses: The motivations and economic consequences of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial
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Table 4b
Determinants of equity investment in ﬁnancial institutions (group regressions based on the type of invested ﬁrms).
Investment in banks Investment in non-bank ﬁnancial
institutions
Investment in the strictly regulated ﬁnancial
sector
Investment in the less-regulated ﬁnancial
sector
Coef. Z value Coef. Z value Coef. Z value Coef. Z value
Constant 4.3297 3.01*** 11.4123 10.88*** 5.2526 4.04*** 11.9061 10.78***
HHI 0.0589 0.15 1.6686 3.36*** 0.2520 0.65 1.4800 2.87***
Q 0.1540 1.40 0.0789 1.15 0.1224 1.22 0.0799 1.12
ROA 3.4757 3.52*** 4.0465 5.00*** 3.2482 3.60*** 4.3459 5.04***
Debtcost 2.2259 2.27** 0.0618 0.69 0.5247 1.50 0.0544 0.59
Size 0.2385 3.54*** 0.4913 10.14*** 0.2876 4.70*** 0.4942 9.75***
Lnage 0.4988 4.61*** 0.4353 5.15*** 0.6490 6.57*** 0.3085 3.44***
Cashholding 0.9761 1.90* 2.2760 5.98*** 0.8268 1.81* 2.4036 5.99***
Cashﬂow 1.1684 2.04** 0.0766 0.18 0.7384 1.44 0.0459 0.10
LEV 0.8170 2.51** 1.6187 6.10*** 1.0541 3.56*** 1.6233 5.77***
Risk 10.5947 2.38** 2.5561 0.74 11.0221 2.70*** 0.5124 0.14
GOV 0.1772 1.46 0.0612 0.64 0.2259 2.02** 0.1395 1.38
Top1 0.9592 2.94*** 0.1728 0.65 0.9003 3.01*** 0.1155 0.41
Lnmindex 0.2413 1.30 0.1821 1.14 0.0608 0.35 0.0814 0.48
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
LR chi2 433.94*** 446.63*** 537.22*** 356.75***
Pseudo R2 0.1314 0.0996 0.1400 0.0890
OBS 4217 4543 4356 4404
Note: the Z values are calculated using robust standard errors.
*** Indicates the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 1%.
** Indicates the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 5%.
* Indicates the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 10%.
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Table 5a
Eﬀect of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial institutions on operating performance (dependent variable: CROA).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coef. T value Coef. T value Coef. T value Coef. T value Coef. T value
Constant 0.1813 5.33*** 0.1813 5.33*** 0.1815 5.34*** 0.1859 5.46*** 0.1887 5.55***
Dﬁn 0.0040 1.63 0.0044 1.59 0.0009 0.29 0.0012 0.46 0.0010 0.36
Dﬁnb 0.0011 0.32
Dﬁnr 0.0059 1.71*
Ratio1 0.0995 2.81***
Ratio2 0.0853 5.14***
Size 0.0065 3.96*** 0.0065 3.96*** 0.0065 3.97*** 0.0066 4.07*** 0.0068 4.15***
LEV 0.0337 5.68*** 0.0338 5.69*** 0.0333 5.62*** 0.0340 5.74*** 0.0323 5.46***
Q 0.0139 12.69*** 0.0139 12.70*** 0.0138 12.65*** 0.0139 12.71*** 0.0138 12.65***
Risk 0.1179 2.21** 0.1178 2.21** 0.1172 2.20** 0.1159 2.18** 0.1150 2.16**
Lnage 0.0241 5.93*** 0.0241 5.92*** 0.0240 5.92*** 0.0243 5.98*** 0.0248 6.11***
GOV 0.0135 4.70*** 0.0135 4.68*** 0.0136 4.73*** 0.0135 4.70*** 0.0136 4.72***
Top1 0.0931 11.15*** 0.0932 11.15*** 0.0928 11.11*** 0.0923 11.05*** 0.0919 11.02***
Lnmindex 0.0002 0.13 0.0002 0.13 0.0002 0.14 0.0001 0.05 0.0000 0.01
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
R2 within 0.1082 0.1082 0.1086 0.1092 0.1116
F 38.11*** 36.46*** 36.59*** 36.83*** 37.74***
OBS 8113 8113 8113 8113 8113
No. of ﬁrms 1182 1182 1182 1182 1182
Note: the t-values are calculated using robust standard errors.
*** Indicates the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 1%.
** Indicates the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 5%.
* Indicates the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 10%.
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exhausted before entering the ﬁnancial sector. For state-controlled ﬁrms, and for determinants of equity
investment in banks, the coeﬃcients on internal cash-ﬂow are positive and signiﬁcant, possibly indicating a
free cash-ﬂow problem. The coeﬃcients on uncertainty are signiﬁcant for the state-controlled ﬁrms sample
and on the determinants of equity investment in banks and in the strictly regulated ﬁnancial sector, which
is consistent with the real stock option theory of investment.
Finally, the explanatory power of the corporate governance variables—the type of controlling shareholder
(GOV), ownership concentration (Top1), and the marketization index (Lnmindex)—also varies. First, govern-
ment control is only important in determining equity investment in the strictly regulated ﬁnancial sector,
which may indicate that connection with the state is useful in obtaining entry permits in the highly regulated
sector. Second, for determinants of equity investment in banks, in the highly regulated ﬁnancial sector, and for
the state-controlled sample, the coeﬃcients on the ownership of the largest shareholder are negative, but pos-
itive for the non-state controlled sample. Therefore, the higher the ownership concentration, the less willing
state-controlled ﬁrms are to invest in the ﬁnancial sector, but the more willing non-state-controlled ﬁrms
are to invest. Finally, the overall explanatory power of the extent of marketization is low.5.3. Economic consequences of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial institutions: Eﬀect on operating returns
(CROA)
Tables 5a and 5b report ﬁrm- and year-ﬁxed eﬀect estimates of the eﬀect on operating returns of holding
equity stakes in ﬁnancial institutions. The coeﬃcients on indicators of equity investment in ﬁnancial
institutions and in banks are insigniﬁcant, but this does not mean there is no eﬀect on operating returns.
The coeﬃcients on the indicator of equity investment in strictly regulated ﬁnancial institutions and on
the depth of investment are negative and statistically signiﬁcant. Investing in strictly regulated ﬁnancialPlease cite this article in press as: Xu, L., Xin, Y. Thorny roses: The motivations and economic consequences of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial
institutions for China’s listed nonﬁnancial ﬁrms. China Journal of Accounting Research (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2016.04.001
Table 5b
Eﬀect of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial institutions on operating performance: The eﬀects of government control (dependent variable:
CROA).
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Coef. T value Coef. T value Coef. T value Coef. T value Coef. T value
Constant 0.1812 5.32*** 0.1808 5.31*** 0.1825 5.36*** 0.1858 5.45*** 0.1886 5.55***
Dﬁn 0.0037 1.02 0.0023 0.52 0.0051 1.06 0.0000 0.00 0.0010 0.26
Dﬁnb 0.0033 0.59
Dﬁnr 0.0161 2.80***
Ratio1 0.1082 2.54**
Ratio2 0.0697 3.39***
Dﬁn * GOV 0.0004 0.09 0.0030 0.62 0.0087 1.57 0.0017 0.40 0.0004 0.08
Dﬁnb * GOV 0.0065 0.99
Dﬁnr * GOV 0.0149 2.22
**
Ratio1 * GOV 0.0103 0.33
Ratio2 * GOV 0.0220 1.35
Size 0.0065 3.96*** 0.0065 3.95*** 0.0065 4.00*** 0.0066 4.07*** 0.0068 4.16***
LEV 0.0337 5.68*** 0.0339 5.71*** 0.0337 5.67*** 0.0340 5.72*** 0.0324 5.46***
Q 0.0139 12.69*** 0.0139 12.69*** 0.0138 12.62*** 0.0139 12.70*** 0.0138 12.60***
Risk 0.1179 2.22** 0.1180 2.22** 0.1169 2.20** 0.1163 2.19** 0.1139 2.14**
Lnage 0.0241 5.93*** 0.0241 5.94*** 0.0242 5.95*** 0.0243 5.99*** 0.0248 6.10***
GOV 0.0134 4.29*** 0.0135 4.32*** 0.0138 4.40*** 0.0131 4.19*** 0.0129 4.13***
Top1 0.0931 11.14*** 0.0934 11.16*** 0.0926 11.08*** 0.0922 11.03*** 0.0918 11.00***
Lnmindex 0.0002 0.13 0.0002 0.15 0.0003 0.22 0.0001 0.04 0.0000 0.02
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
R2 within 0.1082 0.1084 0.1092 0.1093 0.1119
F 36.45*** 33.57*** 33.88*** 33.89*** 34.80***
OBS 8113 8113 8113 8113 8113
No. of ﬁrms 1182 1182 1182 1182 1182
Note: the t-values are calculated using robust standard errors.
*** Indicates the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 1%.
** Indicates the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 5%.
* Indicates the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 10%.
L. Xu, Y. Xin / China Journal of Accounting Research xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 15institutions is therefore negatively related to a ﬁrm’s ability to acquire operating earnings. As the amount of
investment in ﬁnancial institutions increases, operating return on assets decrease.
Table 5b demonstrates the eﬀect of government control when including the interactions of GOV and the
depth variables of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial institutions. The results in Column (8) show that govern-
ment control inﬂuences the eﬀect of operating earnings when investing in strictly regulated ﬁnancial institu-
tions. For non-state-controlled listed ﬁrms, investing in strictly regulated ﬁnancial institutions is associated
with a decrease in operating performance. The coeﬃcient on Dﬁnr is 0.0161, which is signiﬁcant at less than
1%. For state-controlled listed ﬁrms, this investment is not associated with decreased operating performance
and the coeﬃcient on Dﬁnr * GOV is 0.0149, signiﬁcant at less than 5%. The aggregated eﬀect of holding
equity stakes in strictly regulated ﬁnancial institutions is 0.0012 (0.0161 + 0.0149). Non-state-controlled
ﬁrms may place more importance on obtaining entry permits than on short-run economic returns.5.4. Economic consequences of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial institutions: Eﬀect on investment income
(IROA)
Here, we investigate the eﬀect of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial institutions on the performance of exter-
nal expansion. As one component of external expansion, investment in ﬁnancial institutions can contribute to
investment income, which we therefore expect to increase. The ﬁrm- and year-ﬁxed eﬀect estimates are
reported in Tables 6a and 6b. In regression (11) of Table 6a, the coeﬃcient on Dﬁn is positive and signiﬁcant,
indicating that holding equity stakes is positively related with investment income. In regression (12), the coef-Please cite this article in press as: Xu, L., Xin, Y. Thorny roses: The motivations and economic consequences of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial
institutions for China’s listed nonﬁnancial ﬁrms. China Journal of Accounting Research (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2016.04.001
Table 6a
Eﬀect of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial institutions on investment performance (dependent variable: IROA).
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Coef. T value Coef. T value Coef. T value Coef. T value Coef. T value
Constant 0.0707 6.68*** 0.0706 6.67 0.0706 6.67*** 0.0688 6.50*** 0.0694 6.56***
Dﬁn 0.0022 2.86*** 0.0013 1.52 0.0015 1.59 0.0010 1.26 0.0014 1.67*
Dﬁnb 0.0023 2.14**
Dﬁnr 0.0013 1.17
Ratio1 0.0410 3.72***
Ratio2 0.0140 2.71***
Size 0.0034 6.70*** 0.0034 6.71*** 0.0034 6.70*** 0.0033 6.56*** 0.0034 6.61***
LEV 0.0026 1.43 0.0025 1.36 0.0026 1.39 0.0028 1.51 0.0024 1.31
Q 0.0014 4.24*** 0.0015 4.29*** 0.0015 4.27*** 0.0014 4.23*** 0.0015 4.28***
Risk 0.0054 0.32 0.0053 0.32 0.0055 0.33 0.0062 0.37 0.0058 0.35
Lnage 0.0000 0.03 0.0000 0.02 0.0001 0.04 0.0000 0.04 0.0001 0.06
GOV 0.0003 0.29 0.0002 0.21 0.0002 0.27 0.0003 0.30 0.0003 0.29
Top1 0.0033 1.25 0.0034 1.29 0.0033 1.28 0.0036 1.38 0.0035 1.33
Lnmindex 0.0001 0.18 0.0001 0.17 0.0001 0.18 0.0001 0.30 0.0001 0.25
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
R2 within 0.0667 0.0673 0.0669 0.0686 0.0677
F 22.45*** 21.69*** 21.54*** 22.12*** 21.82***
OBS 8113 8113 8113 8113 8113
No. of ﬁrms 1182 1182 1182 1182 1182
Note: the t-values are calculated using robust standard errors.
*** Indicates the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 1%.
** Indicates the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 5%.
* Indicates the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 10%.
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banks can bring more investment income, which is also found in regression (13), where the coeﬃcient on Dﬁnr
is not signiﬁcant. Nevertheless, as regressions (14) and (15) show, investment income increases with the
amount of investment in ﬁnancial institutions.
The eﬀect of government control is also considered, and the results are reported in Table 6b. As regressions
(16) and (17) show, though non-state-controlled ﬁrms earn higher investment income by investing in ﬁnancial
institutions, particularly banks, the investment returns of state-controlled ﬁrms do not increase. The coeﬃ-
cients on Dﬁn * GOV in regression (16) and on Dﬁnb * GOV in regression (17) are negative and signiﬁcant.
Combined with the negatively signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on Dﬁn and Dﬁnb, the overall results become insignif-
icant. However, as the amount of investment grows, state-controlled ﬁrms also increase their investment
income, as shown in regression (19).5.5. Economic consequences of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial institutions: Eﬀect on net income (ROA)
We then investigate the economic consequences of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial institutions in terms of
net income, which is the bottom line of the operating results reported in Tables 7a and 7b. The coeﬃcients on
Dﬁn, Dﬁnb, and Dﬁnr in Table 7a are not signiﬁcant, so investing in ﬁnancial institutions does not increase or
decrease return on assets. However, the coeﬃcients on Ratio1 and Ratio2 are both negative and signiﬁcant at
less than 1%. Therefore, as the amount of the investments increases, return on assets signiﬁcantly decrease. To
summarize the results across Tables 5a, 6a, and 7a, we ﬁnd that as the depth of investing in ﬁnancial
institutions increases, performance from external investment improves. The gains in investment income can-
not, however, make up for the losses in other operating earnings. The aggregated result is a decrease in the
overall return on assets.
We again consider the interaction eﬀects of government control and of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial
institutions. Table 7b shows that the only signiﬁcant eﬀect is found in regression (28), where for non-state
controlled listed ﬁrms, investment in strictly regulated ﬁnancial institutions result in lower return on assets,Please cite this article in press as: Xu, L., Xin, Y. Thorny roses: The motivations and economic consequences of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial
institutions for China’s listed nonﬁnancial ﬁrms. China Journal of Accounting Research (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2016.04.001
Table 6b
Eﬀect of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial institutions on investment performance: The eﬀects of government control (dependent variable:
IROA).
(16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
Coef. T value Coef. T value Coef. T value Coef. T value Coef. T value
Constant 0.0694 6.56*** 0.0697 6.59*** 0.0691 6.53*** 0.0685 6.48*** 0.0684 6.46***
Dﬁn 0.0049 4.30*** 0.0025 1.86* 0.0029 1.96* 0.0046 3.79*** 0.0038 3.09***
Dﬁnb 0.0055 3.18***
Dﬁnr 0.0035 1.96*
Ratio1 0.0103 0.78
Ratio2 0.0151 2.37**
Dﬁn * GOV 0.0041 3.21*** 0.0019 1.22 0.0022 1.28 0.0050 3.83*** 0.0036 2.70***
Dﬁnb * GOV 0.0050 2.46**
Dﬁnr * GOV 0.0033 1.57
Ratio1 * GOV 0.0372 3.87
***
Ratio2 * GOV 0.0032 0.62
Size 0.0034 6.65*** 0.0034 6.68*** 0.0034 6.62*** 0.0033 6.61*** 0.0033 6.57***
LEV 0.0027 1.46 0.0027 1.45 0.0027 1.45 0.0030 1.65* 0.0025 1.34
Q 0.0014 4.16*** 0.0014 4.20*** 0.0014 4.20*** 0.0014 4.19*** 0.0014 4.18***
Risk 0.0059 0.36 0.0057 0.35 0.0061 0.37 0.0075 0.45 0.0061 0.37
Lnage 0.0002 0.12 0.0001 0.04 0.0001 0.11 0.0001 0.11 0.0000 0.03
GOV 0.0010 0.99 0.0011 1.14 0.0010 1.07 0.0008 0.86 0.0009 0.93
Top1 0.0030 1.17 0.0030 1.15 0.0032 1.21 0.0034 1.29 0.0032 1.25
Lnmindex 0.0000 0.11 0.0000 0.05 0.0000 0.05 0.0001 0.26 0.0001 0.17
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
R2 within 0.0681 0.0695 0.0686 0.0717 0.0690
F 21.95*** 20.63*** 20.36*** 21.35*** 20.47***
OBS 8113 8113 8113 8113 8113
No. of ﬁrms 1182 1182 1182 1182 1182
Note: the t-values are calculated using robust standard errors.
*** Indicates the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 1%.
** Indicates the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 5%.
* Indicates the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 10%.
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(0.0133 + 0.0118).
In summary, holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial institutions does not improve ﬁrm performance. As these
ﬁrms are larger, more proﬁtable, and have abundant cash before becoming involved in the ﬁnancial sector,
their actual performance deteriorates.5.6. Additional tests
5.6.1. Other dimensions of ﬁrm performance
We further investigate the economic consequences of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial institutions by test-
ing the eﬀect on other dimensions of ﬁrm performance apart from proﬁtability; transaction costs (Debtcost),
market performance (stock returns), and cash-holdings.13
First, we test changes in transaction costs around investing in the ﬁnancial sector and ﬁnd the investment to
be associated with a higher cost of debt, as the coeﬃcient on Dﬁn is positive and signiﬁcant. Investing in ﬁnan-
cial institutions raises leverage and overdrawing ﬁnancial capacity, which may increase the cost of debt. The
coeﬃcient on Ratio1 * GOV is also positive and signiﬁcant, so the eﬀects on the cost of debt for state-
controlled ﬁrms are therefore even higher.
Second, by using the mean of weekly market adjusted idiosyncratic stock returns during a year, Rw, to rep-
resent the stock price performance, we ﬁnd that this is not inﬂuenced by holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial13 To save space, the empirical results are not reported but are available upon request.
Please cite this article in press as: Xu, L., Xin, Y. Thorny roses: The motivations and economic consequences of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial
institutions for China’s listed nonﬁnancial ﬁrms. China Journal of Accounting Research (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2016.04.001
Table 7a
Eﬀect of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial institutions on ﬁrm performance (dependent variable: ROA).
(21) (22) (23) (24) (25)
Coef. T value Coef. T value Coef. T value Coef. T value Coef. T value
Constant 0.2208 6.84*** 0.2209 6.84*** 0.2210 6.85*** 0.2250 6.97*** 0.2276 7.06***
Dﬁn 0.0021 0.92 0.0018 0.69 0.0006 0.22 0.0004 0.15 0.0024 0.98
Dﬁnb 0.0009 0.28
Dﬁnr 0.0053 1.61
Ratio1 0.0905 2.69***
Ratio2 0.0787 5.01***
Size 0.0089 5.73*** 0.0089 5.73*** 0.0089 5.73*** 0.0090 5.83*** 0.0091 5.91***
LEV 0.0174 3.09*** 0.0173 3.08*** 0.0170 3.03*** 0.0177 3.14*** 0.0161 2.87***
Q 0.0128 12.33*** 0.0128 12.32*** 0.0127 12.28*** 0.0128 12.35*** 0.0127 12.29***
Risk 0.1176 2.33** 0.1176 2.33** 0.1170 2.32** 0.1158 2.29** 0.1149 2.28**
Lnage 0.0213 5.53*** 0.0213 5.54*** 0.0213 5.52*** 0.0215 5.58*** 0.0219 5.71***
GOV 0.0121 4.44*** 0.0122 4.45*** 0.0122 4.47*** 0.0121 4.44*** 0.0121 4.45***
Top1 0.0792 9.99*** 0.0792 9.98*** 0.0789 9.96*** 0.0785 9.90*** 0.0781 9.86***
Lnmindex 0.0012 0.93 0.0012 0.93 0.0012 0.93 0.0011 0.85 0.0011 0.81
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
R2 within 0.1043 0.1043 0.1047 0.1053 0.1076
F 36.58*** 34.99*** 35.11*** 35.34*** 36.20***
OBS 8113 8113 8113 8113 8113
No. of ﬁrms 1182 1182 1182 1182 1182
Note: the t-values are calculated using robust standard errors.
*** Indicates the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 1%.
** Indicates the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 5%.
* Indicates the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 10%.
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tutions are all insigniﬁcant at a 5% level. Decreases in the accounting performance are therefore not reﬂected
or identiﬁed by the market.
Third, we ﬁnd that as its holding of equity stakes in the ﬁnancial sector deepens, a ﬁrm’s cash-holding
decreases, so investing in ﬁnancial institutions consumes cash reserves. The coeﬃcient on Ration1 * GOV is
also negative and signiﬁcant, indicating that this eﬀect is even greater for state-controlled ﬁrms. This of course
can be a mixed blessing, as it also reduces free cash ﬂow.
5.6.2. Robustness checks
To reinforce our empirical results we conduct four types of robustness checks.14
First, we check the robustness of the inﬂuence of government control through the interaction of GOV and
the determining variables of exploring the motivations. In the main tests, we conduct regressions for state-
controlled and non-state-controlled samples separately, and when using the interactions of GOV and the
determinants (HHI, Q, ROA, Debtcost, Size, Lnage, and Cashholding), the results are consistent with those
in Table 5a.
Second, we repeat the tests using only Group 3 ﬁrms to examine the inﬂuence on proﬁtability of holding
equity stakes in ﬁnancial institutions. These ﬁrms did not invest in ﬁnancial institutions at the beginning of
the research period, but made later investments, which they held to the end of the research period. The results
are essentially the same as those in the main tests.
Third, we redo the tests after excluding equity investments in ﬁnance ﬁrms, which are established to serve
the ﬁnancial matters within a group, and therefore internalize transaction costs. The results are consistent with
those including ﬁnance ﬁrms.14 To save space, the empirical results are not reported but are available upon request.
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Table 7b
Eﬀect of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial institutions on ﬁrm performance: eﬀects of government control (dependent variable: ROA).
(26) (27) (28) (29) (30)
Coef. T value Coef. T value Coef. T value Coef. T value Coef. T value
Constant 0.2210 6.84*** 0.2207 6.83*** 0.2220 6.87*** 0.2250 6.96*** 0.2277 7.06***
Dﬁn 0.0024 0.70 0.0005 0.13 0.0049 1.07 0.0008 0.22 0.0019 0.50
Dﬁnb 0.0043 0.82
Dﬁnr 0.0133 2.44**
Ratio1 0.0949 2.35**
Ratio2 0.0630 3.23***
Dﬁn * GOV 0.0004 0.11 0.0018 0.38 0.0062 1.18 0.0006 0.16 0.0006 0.14
Dﬁnb * GOV 0.0051 0.83
Dﬁnr * GOV 0.0118 1.85
*
Ratio1 * GOV 0.0054 0.18
Ratio2 * GOV 0.0218 1.41
Size 0.0089 5.73*** 0.0089 5.72*** 0.0089 5.76*** 0.0090 5.83*** 0.0092 5.92***
LEV 0.0174 3.09*** 0.0174 3.10*** 0.0173 3.07*** 0.0176 3.13*** 0.0162 2.87***
Q 0.0128 12.33*** 0.0128 12.32*** 0.0127 12.27*** 0.0128 12.34*** 0.0127 12.24***
Risk 0.1175 2.33** 0.1177 2.33** 0.1166 2.31** 0.1160 2.30** 0.1138 2.26**
Lnage 0.0213 5.53*** 0.0214 5.54*** 0.0213 5.54*** 0.0215 5.58*** 0.0219 5.69***
GOV 0.0123 4.12*** 0.0124 4.16*** 0.0126 4.22*** 0.0120 4.03*** 0.0118 3.97***
Top1 0.0792 9.99*** 0.0793 10.00*** 0.0788 9.94*** 0.0784 9.89*** 0.0780 9.85***
Lnmindex 0.0012 0.94 0.0012 0.95 0.0013 1.01 0.0011 0.85 0.0010 0.78
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
R2 within 0.1043 0.1044 0.1051 0.1053 0.1078
F 34.99*** 32.21*** 32.45*** 32.50*** 33.39***
OBS 8113 8113 8113 8113 8113
No. of ﬁrms 1182 1182 1182 1182 1182
Note: the t-values are calculated using robust standard errors.
*** Indicates the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 1%.
** Indicates the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 5%.
* Indicates the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 10%.
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performance by introducing the square terms of Ratio1 and Ratio2. No non-linear relationships are found in
regressions on CROA, ROA, Debtcost, Rw, and Cashholding, but may exist for regressions of IROA. The
square terms of Ratio1 and Ratio2 are positive and signiﬁcant at a 1% level, so as the investment level in ﬁnan-
cial institutions increases, the investment income may ﬁrst decrease and then increase. The relation is U-
shaped. However, to conform to other regressions, we do not include the square item in the main tests.
6. Conclusions and future research
An increasing number of commercial ﬁrms have become involved in the ﬁnancial sector during the process
of establishing multi-layered capital markets in China. These ﬁrms are keen to obtain equity stakes in banks
and ﬁrms dealing in securities, venture capital and private equity, insurance, ﬁnance, investment and trusts,
guarantees, futures, asset management, investment funds, and pawnshops, etc. Integrating banking (ﬁnance)
and commerce has been the subject of debate in both practice and in theory for many years, but empirical
evidence on the commercial ownership of banks (and/or ﬁnancial ﬁrms) is scarce. In this study, we provide
evidence by comprehensively investigating the motivations and economic consequences of commercial ﬁrms
entering the ﬁnancial sector.
From a sample of Chinese nonﬁnancial listed A-share ﬁrms from 1999 to 2012, we ﬁnd that there are
numerous motivations for them to hold equity stakes in ﬁnancial ﬁrms. They may be alleviating the compe-
tition pressure in the commercial sector, reducing transaction costs, diversifying operations, or obtaining pre-
cious permits.Please cite this article in press as: Xu, L., Xin, Y. Thorny roses: The motivations and economic consequences of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial
institutions for China’s listed nonﬁnancial ﬁrms. China Journal of Accounting Research (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2016.04.001
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but this is only the case for non-state-controlled ﬁrms, and overall operating income decreases, which cannot
be oﬀset by the increase in investment income. The return on assets declines as a result. Furthermore, after
investing in ﬁnancial institutions the cost of debt rises, cash-holding falls, and stock returns do not improve.
In summary, investing in ﬁnancial institutions does not result in improvements in operating performance,
nor does it reduce transaction costs. Given that these ﬁrms are larger, more proﬁtable, and possess abundant
cash reserves before becoming involved in the ﬁnancial industry, their overall performance does in fact dete-
riorate. This contrasts with the view that the large-scale investment of capital from the commercial sector is
chasing opportunities in the ﬁnancial sector. Our empirical results caution regulators in the ﬁnancial sector
and decision-makers in the commercial sector when considering or allowing entry into the ﬁnancial sector.
The empirical tests in this study are comprehensive but general. Research can further examine the integra-
tion of ﬁnance and commerce. Deeper insights can be gained on the eﬀects on both the ﬁnancial and the com-
mercial sectors. The eﬀects of holding equity stakes in ﬁnancial institutions on investment and ﬁnancing
decision-making processes of ﬁrms in the commercial sector can, for example, be investigated further. In gen-
eral, more studies on commercial ﬁrms’ ownership in ﬁnancial ﬁrms would be of beneﬁt, as the current evi-
dence is slim.
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